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Abstract. In this paper we study the substitution-permutation network
(SPN) on which AES is based. We introduce AES∗, a SPN identical to
AES except that fixed S-boxes are replaced by random and independent
permutations. We prove that this construction resists linear and differen-
tial cryptanalysis with 4 inner rounds only, despite the huge cumulative
effect of multipath characteristics that is induced by the symmetries of
AES. We show that the DP and LP terms both tend towards 1/(2128−1)
very fast when the number of round increases. This proves a conjecture
by Keliher, Meijer, and Tavares. We further show that AES∗ is immune
to any iterated attack of order 1 after 10 rounds only, which substantially
improves a previous result by Moriai and Vaudenay.
Keywords: Differential Cryptanalysis, Linear Cryptanalysis, Differen-
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1 Preamble
When we refer to “cryptanalysis”, we usually think about its destructive side
which consists in breaking cryptographic algorithms. Cryptanalysis however
means “cryptographic analysis”, which includes a constructive side that consists
in proving the security of a system or the soundness of a construction. However,
this last side has not received as much attention for block ciphers. Indeed, secu-
rity proofs often rely on arguments derived from previous cryptanalytic attacks.
We can use linear and differential cryptanalysis [2, 3, 24, 25] (respectively
denoted LC and DC) to illustrate this statement. If C denotes a block cipher,
DC and LC have a complexity which is inversely proportional to the differential
probability1 (DP) [30] and to the linear probability2 (LP) [4] terms respectively.
When using an r-round Markov cipher [21], one can prove that the DP (resp.
LP) is expressed as the sum of the product of the DP’s (resp. LP’s) in all possible
inner chains of differences [37] (resp. masks). We thus usually refer to multipath
characteristics or differentials [21] (resp. linear hull [31]). Typically, attacks make
a heuristic approximation of the DP (resp. LP) by considering only one (single
path) characteristic. If the LP or DP of such a characteristic is significant enough,
? Supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, 200021-107982/1
1 Given an input/output difference of (a, b), DP(a, b) = Pr[C(X)⊕ C(X ⊕ a) = b].
2 Given input/output masks (a, b), LP(a, b) = (2 Pr[a ·X = b · C(X)]− 1)2.
then an attack can definitely be performed. In that situation, the cumulative
effect of the differentials (resp. linear hull) can only make the attack work better
than expected. Similar approximations are also made in security proofs of block
ciphers. This could be acceptable only if one could make sure that, among the
differentials (resp. linear hull), one single path characteristic is overwhelming (so
that the rest can be neglected). Although this is actually the case for DES, this
does not appear to be true for AES [6,7]. Indeed, the argument saying that all DP
and LP terms are at most 2−300 on 8 rounds [6, pp. 30–31] obviously cannot be
true. Since for any a, the sum over all the 2128 values DP(a, b) (resp. LP(a, b))
is equal to 1, at least one value of the DP is larger than 2−128. Obviously,
symmetries in AES are likely to lead to a considerable cumulative effect when
considering many equivalent characteristics. Therefore, proving that there is no
single path characteristic with a significant DP (resp. LP) is not sufficient to
prove the resistance of a block cipher against DC (resp. LC).
In practice, however, differentials and linear hull are rarely taken into consid-
eration in security proofs, as evaluating the true DP or LP is computationally not
practical for a typical block cipher. One natural solution is to try to upper bound
these terms. This approach was chosen by Keliher, Meijer, and Tavares [18, 19]
who showed that the LP of AES is upper bounded by 2−75 for 7 or more rounds.
Park et al. showed [33, 34] that the DP and LP for four rounds are respectively
bounded by 1.144×2−111 and 1.075×2−106. Finally, in a recent work [17], Keliher
shows that the bound on the LP is 1.778× 2−107 for 8 or more rounds.
Another solution is to adopt a Luby-Rackoff-like approach. In their seminal
work [22], Luby and Rackoff showed how to construct a pseudo-random permu-
tation from any pseudo-random function. They provided an example based on
the Feistel scheme [8] (because it is the one on which DES is based). Since then,
the security of Feistel ciphers with random and independent round functions
received a considerable amount of attention (see [9,27,29,35,38], to name only a
few). Although Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) schemes security has
already been widely studied (see for example [5, 13, 14, 19]), only a few papers
adopted a Luby-Rackoff-like approach to study the one on which AES is based
(see for example Moriai-Vaudenay [28] and Keliher-Meijer-Tavares [20]).
In this paper, we analyze the security of the SPN on which AES is based,
where fixed S-boxes are replaced by random and independent permutations. This
scheme, that we call AES∗, is introduced in Section 2, together with some of its
properties with respect to the LP and DP terms. This includes a discussion
about keyed operations, i.e., over the subkey addition and over the substitution
boxes layer. In Section 3, we give an expression of the expected LP over AES∗,
depending on the input/output masks and the number of rounds (see Theo-
rem 6). Using this result, we prove a conjecture made by Keliher, Meijer, and
Tavares in [20], namely that all DP’s and LP’s converge towards 1/(2128 − 1) as
the number of rounds increases (see Theorem 8). This means that AES∗ behaves
exactly like the perfect cipher (as far as LC is concerned) when the number of
rounds is high enough. The rest of Section 3 shows how to reduce the computa-
tional complexity of the expression given in Theorem 6 by exploiting some of the
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symmetries of AES∗ (see Theorem 12). We conclude the section by exhibiting
results of practical experiments. We give the expected LP over AES∗ for several
number of rounds and several S-box sizes, and deduce that AES∗ is protected
against LC after four inner rounds only3. Section 4 shows how these results ex-
tend to differential cryptanalysis. In Section 5 we generalize the results on LC by
considering any iterated attack of order 1 [39]. Recall that these kind of attacks
are very similar to LC, except that the bit of information extracted from each
plaintext/ciphertext pair is not necessarily computed by a linear masking of text
bits, but can be derived using any type of projection (in the sense of [1,41]). Ex-
perimental results show that after 10 rounds, AES∗ is immune to iterated attacks
of order 1. This substantially improves a previous result of Moriai and Vaude-
nay, who showed that 384 were sufficient [28]. Finally, we show in Section 6 by
derandomization techniques that all security results on AES∗ remain valid when
the random S-boxes are replaced by S-boxes with perfect pairwise decorrelation.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Description of AES
AES [6,7] is a block cipher with a fixed block length of 128 bits, supporting 128,
192, and 256 bit keys. It is iterated, meaning that it is made of a succession
of r identical rounds. It is byte oriented, meaning that each round takes as an
input a 128 bit long state that is considered as a one-dimensional vector of
16 bytes. Each round also takes a round key as an input, issued from a key
schedule that takes as an input the main 128 bit key. We do not detail the key
schedule here, since we will assume that all round keys are randomly selected and
independent. Each round is a succession of four operations (we use the notations
of [7]): SubBytes, that applies a fixed S-box to each of the 16 input state bytes,
ShiftRows, which shifts the rows of the state (considered as a 4× 4 array) over
four different offsets, MixColumns, that applies a linear transformation to each
state columns, and AddRoundKey, which is a bitwise XOR between the subkey
and the state. AES is made of 10 rounds (for a 128 bit key), where the last one
does not include the MixColumns operation. The first round is preceded by a
additional AddRoundKey operation.
2.2 Introducing AES∗
In the subsequent, we will be considering a family of block ciphers based on AES.
This family, that we call AES∗, almost follows the same SPN as AES, except for
the last round, which excludes both linear operations (that is, MixColumns and
ShiftRows). Although this modification does not have any influence on the se-
curity results, it simplifies the notations. Moreover, it does not involve a fixed
S-box. Following a Luby-Rackoff-like approach, each S-box will be considered as
3 Note that this result does take hulls effect into consideration.
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an independent permutation chosen uniformly at random. Consequently, we de-
note by SubBytes∗ the confusion step in AES∗. In that sense, AES is a particular
instance of AES∗ where all the S-boxes have been chosen to be the one defined
in the specifications.
Clearly, a truly random S-box following the XOR of a random byte is equiv-
alent to a truly random S-box. Hence, we can completely ignore the addition of
round keys in AES∗.
2.3 States, Activity Patterns, and Notations
We denote by GF(q) the finite field with q elements and by S the set of AES∗
states, so that S = GF(q)16. In the case of AES, q = 28. AES∗ states (or equiva-
lently, masks on AES∗ states) will generally be denoted by bold small letters such
as a,b, etc. An arbitrary state a is a vector which can be viewed as a four by
four array with elements in GF(q) denoted (ai,j)1≤i,j≤4. The four by four array
of {0, 1}16 with 0’s at the positions where the entry of a is 0, and with 1’s where
the entry of a non-zero, is called the activity pattern [6] or support corresponding
to the state a. Supports will either be denoted by Greek letters or by supp(·).
For example, the support corresponding to a state a will either be denoted α
or supp(a). The (i, j) entry in the array α will be denoted αi,j . The Hamming
weight of a support α, denoted |α|, is the number of 1’s in this support (i.e.,
|α| =
∑
i,j αi,j), so that 0 ≤ |α| ≤ 16. When |α| = 0 it means that a is zero,
whereas when |α| = 16, it means that all entries of a are non-zero. In the latter
case, we say that a is a state of full-support. The set of states limited to some
specific support α will be denoted S|α, and thus #S|α = σ
|α|, with σ = q − 1.
The set of states of full-support will be denoted Sfull so that #Sfull = σ
16.
2.4 The Scalar Product and the LP Coefficient
The scalar product of a state (plaintext) x and a state (mask) a is usually
defined as the exclusive-or between several bits of x, chosen according to a
pattern specified by a mask a, which depends on the way the elements of GF(q)
are represented. We prefer here an equivalent definition in terms of the trace
function4 Tr, defined from GF(q) onto GF(2) by Tr(x) = x+x2 +x4 +x8 + · · ·+
x128. If a and b are two arbitrary states of AES, we define the scalar product
of a and b as a • b =
∑
i,j Tr(ai,jbi,j). We use the following well known linear
algebra property.
Lemma 1. Let M denote an arbitrary 16 by 16 matrix of elements in GF(q),
representing a linear transformation on AES states5. Let x be an input state to
this linear transformation M and let b be a non-zero output mask. Then b• (M×
x) = (MT × b) • x.
4 One advantage of this variant is that it does not depend on the way we represent
GF(q). Namely, even if we represent the cells of AES states by the Zech logarithm,
we can still define the scalar product in the same way.
5
AES states are indeed considered as column vectors.
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The efficiency of a linear cryptanalysis can be measured by means of the linear
probability [4]. With our definition of the scalar product, this quantity is defined
in the following way (here we use the notation introduced in [26]): if a and
b are two states and C is some fixed permutation on S, then LPC(a, b) =
(2PrX∈S [a •X = b •C(X)]− 1)
2, where the probability holds over the uniform
distribution of X.
2.5 Expected LP over Keyed Operations in AES∗
A round key, or simply a key, is an AES state. The only keyed operation in AES is
AddRoundKey. As stated in Section 2.2, we can ignore this operation in AES∗. We
can thus consider the choice of the random S-boxes as the only keyed operation
in AES∗. The following lemma evaluates the average LP over all possible random
S-boxes.
Lemma 2. Let a, b ∈ GF(q) \ {0} be two non-zero input/output masks on
the uniformly distributed random S-box S∗ and let σ = q − 1. The average
LP value over all possible random S-boxes is independent of a and b, and is
ES∗ [LP
S
∗
(a, b)] = σ−1.
Proof. See Lemma 14 in [39] for a direct proof. One can also use the explicit
distribution of the LP of S∗ [20], deduced from results available in [32]. ut
Note that for any S-box S we have LPS(a, 0) = LPS(0, b) = 0 (for non-zero a
and b) and LPS(0, 0) = 1. From this, we derive the expected LP over SubBytes∗.
Lemma 3. Let a and b be two non-zero masks in GF(q)16, and let α and β be
their respective supports. Let σ = q − 1. We have E[LPSubBytes
∗
(a, b)] = σ−|α|
if α = β and 0 otherwise, where the mean is taken over all possible uniformly
distributed and independent random S-boxes.
3 Expected LP on AES∗
3.1 From Sums over Masks to Sums over Supports
The complexity of computing the expected LP of AES is prohibitive for the
reason that, once input/output masks are given, one has to sum over all possible
intermediate masks in order to take into account every possible characteristic. We
will see that AES∗ provides just enough randomization for this sum to be made
over intermediate supports. Consequently, we will need to count the number of
possible states succession corresponding to some given succession of supports.
Definition 4. Let LT denote the linear transformation of AES, i.e., the oper-
ation corresponding to MixColumns ◦ ShiftRows. Let α and β be two supports
and
N[α,β] = #{(a, b) ∈ S|α × S|β : LT
T × b = a},
where states a and b are considered as column vectors here. N[α,β] is the number
of ways of connecting a support α to a support β through LT.
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From now on, we will consider an r-round version of AES∗, with r > 1. Round i ∈
{1, . . . , r} will be denoted by Round∗i , where the last round Round
∗
r excludes the
linear transformation LT. With these notations, AES∗ = Round∗r◦· · ·◦Round
∗
1. The
input/output masks on Round∗i will usually be denoted ci−1 and ci respectively,
while their corresponding supports will be denoted γ i−1 and γi. Consequently,
c0 and cr will respectively denote the input and the output masks on a r-rounds
version of AES∗. Using Lemma 3, we can derive the expected LP over one round
and extend it to the full AES∗.
Lemma 5. Let ci−1 and ci be two non-zero masks in GF(q)
16 of support γi−1
and γi respectively. Let σ = q − 1. For 1 ≤ i < r, the expected linear probability
over Round∗i is given by E[LP
Round
∗
i (ci−1, ci)] = σ
−|γi−1| if γi−1 = supp(LT
T ×
ci) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the expected LP over the last round is given by
E[LPRound
∗
r (cr−1, cr)] = σ
−|γr−1| if γr−1 = γr and 0 otherwise.
Proof. We first consider the case where 1 ≤ i < r. Using Lemma 1, we have
E[LPRound
∗
i (ci−1, ci)] = E[LP
SubBytes
∗
(ci−1, LT
T × ci)]. Lemma 3 allows to con-
clude. The proof for the i = r case is similar, except that we don’t make use of
Lemma 1 as the last round excludes LT. ut
Theorem 6. Let c0 and cr be two masks in GF(q)
16 of support γ0 and γr
respectively. Let σ = q − 1. The expected linear probability over r > 1 rounds of
AES
∗, when c0 is the input mask and cr the output mask is
E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] = σ
−|γr| ×
(
Mr−1
)
γ0,γr
,
where M is a 216×216 square matrix, indexed by pairs of masks (γi−1,γi), such
that Mγi−1,γi = σ
−|γi−1|N[γi−1,γi].
Proof. Following Nyberg [31], E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] =
∑∏r
i=1 E[LP
Round
∗
i (ci−1, ci)],
where the sum is taken over all intermediate masks c1, . . . , cr−1. Using the results
(and the notations) of Lemma 5 this gives
E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] =
∑
c1,...,cr−1
δ1,...,δr−1
σ−|γr−1|1γr−1=γr
r−1∏
i=1
σ−|γi−1|1γi−1=supp(LTT×ci)
δi=γi
,
where the sum is also taken over all possible intermediate supports. Taking
δ0 = γ0 and δr = γr and including the sum over the ci’s in the product,
we obtain E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] = σ
−|δr|
∑
δ1,...,δr−2
∏r−1
i=1 σ
−|δi−1|N[δi−1, δi]. The
definition of the product of square matrices concludes the proof. ut
Using supports drops the matrix size from 2128 down to 216. As one matrix multi-
plication roughly takes (216)3 field operations6 and, using a square and multiply
technique, log r such multiplications are needed, the overall number of operations
needed to compute Mr−1 is roughly equal to 250 (for 8 rounds) by using 2× 232
6 Using Strassen’s algorithm, the complexity drops to (216)log 7 field operations [40].
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multiple precision rational number registers. This is still pretty hard to imple-
ment using ordinary hardware. Nevertheless, from one computation of Mr−1 we
could deduce all expected linear probability over all possible input/output masks
almost for free. In section 3.3, we show how to exploit symmetries of table N[·, ·]
in order to further reduce the matrix size.
3.2 Towards the True Random Cipher
For any non-zero mask c, LPAES
∗
(c, 0) = LPAES
∗
(0, c) = 0 and LPAES
∗
(0, 0) = 1.
Thus, the 216 × 216 square matrix M of Theorem 6 has the following shape
M =
(
1 0
0 M′
)
(1)
where M′ is a (216−1)× (216−1) square matrix, indexed by non-zero supports.
We can now notice from Theorem 6 that E[LPAES
∗
(c0, c2)] = σ
−|γ2|M′γ0,γ2 for
any non-zero supports c0 and c2. Recall that
∑
c2
E[LPAES
∗
(c0, c2)] = 1. Hence
1 =
∑
c2
σ−|γ2|M′γ0,γ2 =
∑
γ2
σ|γ2|σ−|γ2|M′γ0,γ2 =
∑
γ2
M′γ0,γ2 .
We also note that M′γ0,γ2 ≥ 0 for any γ0 and γ2.
Lemma 7. The matrix M′ defined by (1) is the transition matrix of a Markov
chain, whose set of states is the set of non-zero supports and whose transition
probability from a non-zero support γ to a non-zero support γ ′ is given by Mγ,γ′ .
The transition graph of the Markov chain is the directed graph whose vertices
are the σ non-zero supports and such that there is an edge from γ to γ ′ when
Mγ,γ′ > 0. From the study of supports propagation [6] (which is based on
the MDS criterion), it clearly appears that from any graph state, there is a path
towards the graph state corresponding to the full support γ full (for example, two
steps are required to go from a support of Hamming weight 1 to γ full). Moreover,
from the graph state corresponding to γ full one can reach any graph state. Hence,
from each graph state there is a sequence of arrows leading to any other graph
state. This means that the corresponding Markov chain is irreducible [12]. Since
there is an arrow from γfull to itself, one can find a sequence of arrows leading
from any graph state to any graph state, of any (yet long enough) length. This
means the Markov chain is aperiodic. We can deduce that there exists exactly
one stationary distribution (see for example chapter 5 in [12]), i.e., a 1×(216−1)
row vector pi = (piγ)γ 6=0 indexed by non-zero supports such that piγ ≥ 0 for all
non-zero γ with
∑
γ 6=0 piγ = 1, and such that piM
′ = pi (which is to say that
piγ′ =
∑
γ 6=0 piγM
′
γ,γ′ for all non zero γ
′). It is easy to show that the row vector
pi indexed by non-zero supports such that piγ = σ
|γ|(q16 − 1)−1 is a stationary
distribution of the Markov chain described by the transition matrix M′. Indeed,
∑
γ 6=0
piγ =
1
q16 − 1
∑
γ 6=0
(
16∑
s=1
1s=|γ|
)
σ|γ| =
1
q16 − 1
16∑
s=1
(
16
s
)
σs = 1,
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di,1 di,2 di,3 di,4ci,1 ci,2 ci,3 ci,4
Fig. 1. The four column’s and diagonal’s weights of a state γi
and therefore pi is a probability distribution. Moreover, for any non-zero γ ′,
(piM′)γ′ = (q
16 − 1)−1
∑
γ 6=0 N[γ,γ
′] = (q16 − 1)−1σ|γ
′| = piγ′ , as the sum is
simply the number of non-zero states that can be connected to some non-zero
support γ′ through LT, which is exactly the number of states of support equal
to γ′, as each state of support γ ′ has one and only one preimage through LT.
It is known [11] that (M′r)γ,γ′ → piγ′ when r →∞. As E[LP
AES
∗
(c0, cr)] =
σ−|γr|(M′r−1)γ0,γr for non-zero masks c0 and cr, we have proven the following
theorem (which corresponds to the conjecture in [20]).
Theorem 8. Let c0 and cr be two non-zero masks in GF(q)
16. Then
lim
r→∞
E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] =
1
q16 − 1
. (2)
We conclude this discussion by wondering how fast does the expected LP of AES∗
tends towards (q16 − 1)−1. As M′ is the transition matrix of a finite irreducible
and aperiodic chain, the Perron-Frobenius Theorem [11] states that λ1 = 1 is an
eigenvalue of M′, while the remaining eigenvalues λ2, . . . , λm satisfy |λj | < 1.
Assuming that λ1 > |λ2| ≥ · · · ≥ |λm|, the rate of the convergence depends on
|λ2|. If we let λ be any real value such that 1 > λ > |λ2|, we deduce that for any
non-zero masks c0 and cr, E[LP
AES
∗
(c0, cr)] =
1
q16−1 + O(λ
r) when r →∞.
Note that the same results can be obtained on AES itself with independent
round keys using almost the same proof. The only change is that one needs to
prove that for any non-zero masks a and b, there is a number of rounds r such
that LPRoundr◦···◦Round1(a, b) 6= 0. Equivalently, we can prove it with DP’s by
using results by Wernsdorf et al. [15, 42].
3.3 Combinatorial Tables on Supports
We will see that, thanks to the properties of LT, N[γi−1,γi] only depends on the
weights of the diagonals of γi−1 and of the columns of γi. We introduce notations
to deal with Hamming weights of columns and diagonals. If γ i is the ith support
in a characteristic, we denote by ci = (ci,1, ci,2, ci,3, ci,4) the vector of the four
weights of γi’s columns. Similarly, we denote by di = (di,1, di,2, di,3, di,4) the
four weights of γi’s diagonals. What we mean by columns and diagonals should
be clear from Figure 1. Finally, we denote by wij = (di, cj) the weight pattern
of a pair of supports (γi,γj). Note that |w
i
j | = |γi|+ |γj | and that this weight
pattern only includes the weights of the diagonals of γ i and of the columns of γj .
Consequently, if γi−1 and γi are two successive masks in a characteristic, w
i−1
i
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contains enough information to compute N[γi−1,γi] (as we will see in Corollary
10). We now recall a known fact about the weight distribution of MDS codes.
Theorem 9 (Theorem 7.4.1 in [16]). Let C be an [n, k, d] MDS code over
GF(q). For i = 0, . . . , n, the number Ai of codewords of weight i is given by
A0 = 1, Ai = 0 for 1 ≤ i < d and Ai =
(
n
i
)∑i−d
j=0(−1)
j
(
i
j
)
(qi+1−d−j − 1) for
d ≤ i ≤ n, where d = n− k + 1.
The MixColumns operation is a linear multipermutation [36], as the set of all
codewords (a, MixColumns(a)) is a [8, 4, 5] MDS code.
Corollary 10. Let γi−1 and γi be two successive supports of a characteristic
and let wi−1i = (di−1, ci) be their weight pattern. We have
N[γi−1,γi] =
4∏
s=1
Adi−1,s+ci,s(
8
di−1,s+ci,s
) .
Thus, wi−1i is sufficient to compute N[γi−1,γi] so that we will denote this value
by N[wi−1i ]. By symmetry, it is clear that an arbitrary permutation applied on
both the diagonal’s and column’s weights of wi−1i will not change the value of
N[wi−1i ], i.e., if two weight patterns w = (d, c) and w
′ = (d′, c′) are such that
(d1, d2, d3, d4, c1, c2, c3, c4) = (d
′
pi(1), d
′
pi(2), d
′
pi(3), d
′
pi(4), c
′
pi(1), c
′
pi(2), c
′
pi(3), c
′
pi(4))
for some permutation pi of [1, 4], then N[w] = N[w′]. It is natural to consider
such weight patterns as equivalent and to choose a unique representative for each
equivalence class. We arbitrarily choose to take the greatest element in the sense
of the lexicographic order as the representative and denote it w. The number of
elements in the equivalence class of w will be denoted C[w]. By the end of this
section, we will be summing over weight patterns of supports surrounding the
linear transformation LT (Theorem 12) instead of supports between individual
rounds (Theorem 6). It will be natural to link both concepts. Given two suc-
cessive weight patterns wi−1i = (di−1, ci) and w
i
i+1 = (di, ci+1), we denote by
P[wi−1i ,w
i
i+1] the number of supports γ (between rounds i and i+1) compatible
with these weight patterns, i.e., the number of supports γ of weight pattern (d, c)
such that d = di and c = ci (see Figure 2). In other words, table P[· , ·] gives
the number of possible supports with given Hamming weights of the columns
and of the diagonals. We note that by shifting columns, this is equivalent to
counting 4 × 4 binary matrices with given weights for every row and column.
Consequently, P[wi−1i ,w
i
i+1] remains unchanged by permuting the weight of the
diagonals given by ci and/or the weight of the columns given by di.
Lemma 11. Let (γi−1,γi,γi+1) be a characteristic of supports on two rounds,
let wi−1i = (di−1, ci) and w
i
i+1 = (di, ci+1) be the weight pattern of (γi−1,γi)
and (γi,γi+1) respectively, and let w
i−1
i and w
i
i+1 be their representatives. Then
N[wi−1i ] = N[w
i−1
i ], P[w
i−1
i ,w
i
i+1] = P[w
i−1
i ,w
i
i+1], and |w
i−1
i | = |w
i−1
i |.
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Round∗iw
i−1
i = (di−1, ci)
Round∗i+1w
i
i+1 = (di, ci+1)
γ
γi−1 (diagonal weights given by di−1)
γi+1 (column weights given by ci+1)
Fig. 2. Given wi−1i and w
i
i+1, there are P[w
i−1
i ,w
i
i+1] compatible supports γ’s
3.4 From Sums over Supports to Sums over Weight Pattern
Representatives
Theorem 12. Let c0 and cr be two masks in GF(q)
16 of support γ0 and γr
respectively. Let d0 denote the weight vector of γ0’s diagonals and let cr denote
the weight vector of γr’s columns. Let σ = q − 1. Let L be the square matrix
indexed by weight patterns representatives, defined by
Lu,v = R[u]P[u, v]R[v] where R[u] =
√
σ
1
2
|u|C[u]N[u] .
Finally, let U(d0) and V(cr) be the column vectors indexed by weight patterns
representatives, defined by
U(d0)v = σ
− 1
2
|d0|R[v]C[v]−1
∑
u=(d,c)
1u=v1d=d0 and
V(cr)v = σ
− 1
2
|cr|R[v]C[v]−1
∑
u=(d,c)
1u=v1c=cr .
Then the expected linear probability over r > 1 rounds of AES∗ is
E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] = U(d0)
T × Lr−2 × V(cr) .
Proof. For simplicity, E[LPAES
∗
(c0, cr)] will simply be denoted ELP(c0, cr) and
we will consider the case where r > 2. In Theorem 6, we had
ELP(c0, cr) = σ
−|γr|
∑
γ1,...,γr−2
r−1∏
i=1
σ−|γi−1|N[γi−1,γi].
We notice that 2
∑r
i=1 |γi−1| = |w
r
0|+
∑r−1
i=1 |w
i−1
i |, where we used the fact that,
as we do not need to take into account characteristics that give a zero linear prob-
ability, γr−1 = γr (see Lemma 5). From this and from Corollary 10, we deduce
that ELP(c0, cr) = σ
− 1
2
|wr
0
|
∑
γ1,...,γr−2
∏r−1
i=1 D[w
i−1
i ], where D[w] = σ
1
2
|w|N[w].
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As we want to consider weight patterns instead of supports, we introduce a new
sum and permute both sums to obtain
ELP(c0, cr) = σ
− 1
2
|wr
0
|
∑
u0
1
,...,u
r−2
r−1

 ∑
γ1,...,γr−2
r−1∏
j=1
1
w
j−1
j
=uj−1
j

 r−1∏
i=1
D[ui−1i ] .
Denoting uj−1j = (d
′
j−1, c
′
j), it is easy to show that
∑
γ1,...,γr−2
r−1∏
j=1
1
u
j−1
j
=wj−1
j
= 1d′
0
=d01c′r−1=cr−1
r−2∏
j=1
∑
γj
1(dj ,cj)=(d′j ,c′j) .
As, by definition, P[uj−1j ,u
j
j+1] =
∑
γj
1(dj ,cj)=(d′j ,c′j), this gives
ELP(c0, cr) = σ
− 1
2
|wr
0
|
∑
u0
1
,...,u
r−2
r−1
1c′r−1=cr−1
d
′
0
=d0
D[ur−2r−1]
r−2∏
i=1
D[ui−1i ]P[u
i−1
i ,u
i
i+1] .
We denote Lu,v = C[u]
1
2 D[u]
1
2 P[u, v]C[v]
1
2 D[v]
1
2 and F[u] = D[u]
1
2 C[u]−
1
2 . Using
Lemma 11, the last expression becomes
ELP(c0, cr) = σ
− 1
2
|wr
0
|
∑
u0
1
,u
r−2
r−1
1d′
0
=d01c′r−1=cr−1F[u
0
1]F[u
r−2
r−1](L
r−2)
u0
1
,u
r−2
r−1
.
Introducing (U(d0))u0
1
and (V(cr−1))ur−2
r−1
in the previous expression leads (as
cr−1 = cr) to the announced result. ut
In order to evaluate the complexity of the matrix multiplication of Theorem 12,
we need to evaluate the size of the matrices, i.e., the number of equivalence
classes. There are 20475 ≈ 214.33 such classes. Yet, it is not necessary to consider
those equivalence classes for which N[·] is 0. It can be checked that the number of
remaining equivalence classes is 1001 ≈ 210. The computation of Lr−1 therefore
roughly takes 230 · log r operations, which is feasible on standard computers.
3.5 Experimental Linear Hull for Various S-box Sizes
Theorems 6 and 12 remain valid with several sizes of S-boxes. We implemented
the computation of Theorem 12 with various sizes, our experimental results were
obtained using GMP [10]. They are shown in Table 1. It appears that 4 rounds
are enough to provide security against LC. We do not provide any result for the
case where the S-box acts on 2 bit elements as it is impossible to find a 4 × 4
matrix with elements in GF(22) such that MixColumns stays a multipermutation.
A second independent implementation of the computation was implemented in
Maple [23] in order to obtain perfect results instead of floating point numbers.
It was used for the masks presenting the maximum expected LP in Table 1.
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Table 1. maxa,b E[LP
AES
∗
(a, b)] for various number of rounds r and S-box sizes.
r 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3 bits 2−13.2294 2−19.6515 2−44.9177 2−44.9177 2−47.3861 2−47.9966 2−47.9999 2−48.0
4 bits 2−17.6276 2−27.3482 2−62.5102 2−62.5102 2−63.9852 2−63.9999 2−63.9999 2−64.0
5 bits 2−21.8168 2−34.6793 2−79.2671 2−79.2671 2−79.9999 2−79.9999 2−79.9999 2−80.0
6 bits 2−25.9091 2−41.8409 2−95.6364 2−95.6364 2−95.9999 2−95.9999 2−96.0 2−96.0
7 bits 2−29.9547 2−48.9207 2−111.8189 2−111.8189 2−111.9999 2−111.9999 2−112.0 2−112.0
8 bits 2−33.9774 2−55.9605 2−127.9096 2−127.9096 2−127.9999 2−127.9999 2−128.0 2−128.0
4 Expected DP on AES∗
Just as the efficiency of LC can be measured by means of LP’s, the efficiency
of DC can be measured by means of DP’s [30]. If C is some fixed permutation
on S and if a and b are two masks, the differential probability is given by
DPC(a, b) = PrX∈S [C(X⊕a) = C(X)⊕b], where the probability holds over the
uniform distribution of X. Here, a (resp. b) represents the input (resp. output)
difference between the pair of plaintexts (resp. ciphertexts). The computations
that we performed on the expected LP of AES∗ can be applied, with almost
no modification, in order to compute the expected DP. The major modification
concerns Lemma 1. We provide here its version for the DP.
Lemma 13. Let M denote an arbitrary 16 by 16 matrix of elements in GF(q),
representing a linear transformation on AES states (considered as column vec-
tors). If the difference between two inputs of this transformation is equal to a,
then the output difference is equal to M× a.
We now follow the steps that lead to the final result on the LP coefficient and see
whether they apply to the DP coefficient. Lemma 2 applies to the DP coefficient,
and therefore, it is also the case for Lemma 3 (where we use the independence
of the the 16 inputs on the S-boxes in order to obtain a product of DP, instead
of using Matsui’s Piling-up Lemma). Because the relation between an input
difference on the linear transformation of AES and its output difference is not
the same as in the case where we considered input/output masks, it looks as
if we must replace LTT by LT−1 in Definition 4. But according to Theorem 9,
the actual values of N[·] do not depend on which multipermutation is used, it
just needs to be one. In other words, replacing LTT by LT−1 in the definition
of N[·] does not change its entries. The computations on the LP coefficient thus
still apply for the DP coefficient. Theorems 6, 8, and 12 apply to the DP, the
numerical results given in Table 1 being exactly the same.
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5 Extension to Iterated Attacks of Order 1
In the Luby-Rackoff model [22], an adversary A has an unlimited computa-
tional power, but has limited access to an oracle O. The oracle implements
either an instance of a given cipher C (such as AES∗) or of the perfect cipher
C∗, the objective of the adversary being to guess which is the case (see Fig-
ure 3). Eventually, the adversary will output 1 (resp. 0) if his guess is that
the oracle implements C (resp. C∗). Denoting by Pr[AO → 1] the probability
that the adversary outputs 1 depending on the oracle O, his ability to distin-
guish C from C∗ is measured by means of the advantage AdvA = |Pr[A
C →
1] − Pr[AC
∗
→ 1]|. The most powerful adversary will select his d queries de-
pending on the previous answers of the oracle. Such an adversary is called a
d-limited adaptative distinguisher [39]. The advantage of the best distinguisher
of this type is such that AdvA =
1
2 ‖ [C]
d − [C∗]d ‖a, where [C]
d is the d-
wise distribution matrix7 of the random permutation C over S, and where
‖ M ‖a= maxx1
∑
y1
· · ·maxxd
∑
yd
|M(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd)| for any #S
d × #Sd
matrix M (Theorem 11 in [39]). Proving the resistance of C against such a
2d-limited distinguisher is sufficient to prove its resistance against any iterated
attacks of order d (Theorem 18 in [39]). Using Theorem 14, we bound the ad-
vantage of the best 2-limited adaptative distinguisher and deduce the number
rounds necessary to resist any iterated attacks of order 1.
C or C∗A O
x1, . . . , xd
y1, . . . , yd
1 or 0
Fig. 3. An adversary A limited to d questions to an oracle O
Theorem 14. Let C be a random permutation over {0, 1}n. If  is the non-
negative value such that  = maxa6=0,b E[DP
C(a, b)] − 12n−1 , we have ‖ [C
′]2 −
[C∗]2 ‖a≤ 2
nε where C′(x) = C(x ⊕ K1) ⊕ K2 with independent and uniformly
distributed K1 and K2.
Proof. Let x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}
n. Starting from the definition of [C′]2, we have
[C′]2(x1,x2),(y1,y2) =
∑
c
Pr
K1,K2
[
c(x1 ⊕K1) = y1 ⊕K2
c(x2 ⊕K1) = y2 ⊕K2
]
Pr[C = c],
as C is independent from (K1,K2). Furthermore, we have
Pr
K1,K2
[
c(x1 ⊕K1) = y1 ⊕K2
c(x2 ⊕K1) = y2 ⊕K2
]
=
∑
u,v
1 x1 ⊕ x2 = u
y1 ⊕ y2 = v
Pr
K1,K2
[
c(K1) = K2
c(u⊕K1) = v ⊕K2
]
7 Recall that the d-wise distribution matrix of a random function F is such that
[F ]d(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd) is the probability that F (xi) = yi for all i = 1, . . . , d
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Table 2. Values of  depending of the number of rounds r
r 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 2−33.98 2−55.96 2−131.95 2−131.95 2−152.17 2−174.74 2−200.39 2−223.93 2−270.82
where the probability in the sum is equal to
2−2n
∑
k1,k2
1 c(k1 ⊕ u) = k2 ⊕ v
c(k1) = k2
= 2−n Pr
K1
[c(K1)⊕ c(K1 ⊕ u) = v] = 2
−nDPc(u, v) .
Therefore, [C′]2(x1,x2),(y1,y2) = 2
−nEC[DP
C(x1 ⊕ x2, y1 ⊕ y2)]. As the sum of the
DPC
∗
on the input mask is 1 (as C∗ is a permutation), EC∗ [DP
C
∗
(x1 ⊕ x2, y1 ⊕
y2)] =
1
2n−1 when x1 6= x2 (when x1 = x2, the DP value is always 0, except when
y1 ⊕ y2 is also 0, in which case DP is 1). From the last two equations we deduce
[C′]2(x1,x2),(y1,y2) − [C
∗]2(x1,x2),(y1,y2) = 2
−n
(
EC[DP
C(x1 ⊕ x2, y1 ⊕ y2)]−
1
2n−1
)
,
and thus, by definition of the || · ||a norm, ||[C
′]2 − [C∗]2||a is upper bounded by
2−n
∑
y1,y2
maxx1 6=x2 |EC[DP
C(x1 ⊕ x2, y1 ⊕ y2)]− (2
n − 1)−1| = 2nε. ut
Such an  always exists, as the maximum DP (or LP) value is always larger or
equal to 1/(2n − 1). Experimental results on  (obtained both with our GMP
and Maple implementations) are given in Table 2 for several number of rounds.
We conclude that provable security is achieved for 10 rounds of AES∗ (which
substantially improves [28], where it is shown that 384 rounds are enough).
6 Derandomizing the S-boxes
We note that all results presented so far hold if replace the uniformly dis-
tributed random S-box S∗ by any random S-box S, provided that it satis-
fies ES[LP
S(a, b)] = σ−1 (which is proved for S∗ in Lemma 2). According to
Lemma 14 in [39],
ES[LP
S(a, b)] = q−2
∑
x1,x2
y1,y2
(−1)(x1⊕x2)•a+(y1⊕y2)•b Pr[S(x1) = y1,S(x2) = y2].
Hence, ES[LP
S(a, b)] only depends on the pairwise distribution. If S has a per-
fect pairwise decorrelation, we deduce ES[LP
S(a, b)] = σ−1. In order to con-
struct such a variant of AES, one can just insert a MulRoundKey operation be-
fore each AddRoundKey of AES, with independent subkeys, where MulRoundKey
is the component-wise product in GF(q) of an input state and a subkey, i.e.,
considering the three states a, b,k as a one-dimensional vectors of 16 bytes,
b = MulRoundKey(a,k) ⇔ bi = ai × ki for i = 1, . . . , 16.
Note that all the component of a subkey k used in a MulRoundKey operation
have to be non-zero to preserve bijectivity.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
We studied the SPN on which AES is based using a Luby-Rackoff-like approach.
Following [20] and [28], we considered that the only “round function” that can
reasonably be replaced by a random one is the S-box. We chose to replace the S-
boxes by random and independent permutations. In this model, we computed the
exact (i.e., using neither heuristic approximations nor bounds) hull and differen-
tial average probabilities. Clearly, a better model (i.e., intuitively closer to the
real AES) would be to choose one permutation at random and use it throughout
the whole cipher, although it is not clear to us that one can easily prove similar
security results in that case. Obviously, we cannot draw direct consequences on
the security of AES. At least we get some increased confidence in its high-level
structure and claim that AES with independent keys has no useful linear hull nor
differentials, unless the S-box structure selection is really unfortunate. We also
pushed the analysis further by studying iterated attacks of order 1. We showed
that ten inner rounds are sufficient to ensure the security of AES∗ against any
attack of this kind. Finally, we proved the (non-surprising) convergence of AES∗
towards the perfect cipher (as far as LC and DC are concerned) as the number
of rounds increases, which was only conjectured so far.
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